Jane Doe sued Carnival Corporation, alleging that she had been sexually assaulted by a crewmember during a cruise and that Carnival was liable for negligent hiring and supervision; intentional infliction of emotional distress; false imprisonment; and sexual assault by a crewmember of a passenger. A jury returned a verdict for Doe in excess of $10 million. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit vacated the verdict based on the district court’s error in granting partial summary judgment in Doe’s favor on one of her claims, an error caused by misapplication of the rule against hearsay and its exceptions. Doe v. Carnival Corp., 2026 WL 2491151 (11th Cir. Aug. 25, 2026).
The incident giving rise to Doe’s claims occurred in a ship’s storage closet, while Doe was inebriated. What happened was disputed, but immediately after the incident Doe told her friend that she had been held in the closet against her will and sexually assaulted by a crewmember. She also provided a handwritten statement to the ship’s security officers. An investigation by two FBI Special Agents ensued. The agents interviewed Doe and the crewmember, producing notes and then a report. The report included a description of the investigation, including Doe’s and the crewmember’s accounts of the incident; the conclusion of Special Agent Sarah Andreasen that the sexual encounter had been consensual; and the fact that a federal prosecutor had declined to prosecute the crewmember.
In her civil action against Carnival, Doe testified in deposition that she could not recall how she entered the closet, whether she consented to the sexual encounter, whether the crewmember locked the door to the closet, or whether she attempted to leave the closet. The crewmember was not deposed. According to the FBI agents’ notes and report, however, the crewmember had told the investigating agents that the encounter was consensual, that Doe had followed him into the closet, and that he did not know that Doe was inebriated.
Doe filed a motion for partial summary judgment on her false imprisonment claim, arguing that Carnival had no evidence to dispute her claim that she was unlawfully detained in the closet. Carnival responded by citing the FBI report for both the crewmember’s version of events and the FBI’s conclusion that the encounter was consensual. In reply, Doe argued that the FBI report was inadmissible hearsay and that even if the report were admissible, it would be unduly prejudicial. A magistrate judge issued a report and recommendation concluding that the FBI report’s account of the crewmember’s statements was inadmissible hearsay and recommending that Doe’s motion be granted. The R&R did not separately address the admissibility of the FBI’s conclusion that the encounter was consensual or of the statement in the report that the government had declined to prosecute.
Carnival objected to the R&R, arguing that even if the report were inadmissible as to the crewmember’s statements, the FBI’s own conclusion as to consent was admissible as a public record (absent a showing that the special agent was untrustworthy, which showing Carnival argued had not been made). The district court overruled the objection and accepted the R&R in full. The district court later granted Doe’s motion in limine as to the FBI report.
But the FBI notes—as opposed to the report—were admitted on stipulation of the parties. The notes, like the report, included two “diametrically opposed” accounts of the events in question. Accordingly, following admission of the notes, Carnival asked the district court to reconsider its order granting summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim. The district court declined to revisit its order, citing the prejudice to Doe of reconsideration so close to trial.
Special Agent Andreasen testified at trial, including as to her training and experience investigating sexual assault, but the district court precluded her from discussing her finding that the encounter had been consensual or the fact that the government had declined prosecution. The district court also forbade Carnival from asking Doe’s experts questions about the FBI reports, despite the fact that both experts—one on security protocols and one on damages—had relied on the reports in developing their analyses.
The jury found in Carnival’s favor on Doe’s claims for negligence and intentional infliction of emotional distress, but in Doe’s favor as to sexual assault by a crewmember. The jury had also been instructed that “[t]he only issue for your determination on the matter of false imprisonment is whether the false imprisonment caused plaintiff damages and, if so, what amount.” The jury awarded Doe approximately $10.25 million on the sexual assault and false imprisonment claims. Carnival appealed.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the grant of partial summary judgment; vacated the judgment of the district court on the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims (Doe did not cross-appeal the judgment on the other two claims); and remanded the case for a new trial. Judge Lagoa, writing for the court, began by acknowledging the “exceptional procedural posture” of the appeal. But the grant of partial summary judgment on liability for false imprisonment was a non-appealable interlocutory order, and the propriety of that ruling was appealable only after final judgment was entered.
The district court’s grant of summary judgment on liability for false imprisonment was error, because it was premised on the erroneous exclusion of the FBI report in its entirety. In assessing the admissibility of the report, the district court should have distinguished between the summary of witnesses’ statements—which featured two levels of hearsay—and the FBI’s conclusion that the encounter had been consensual, which needed only one hearsay exception to render it admissible. The public records exception, which excepts from the hearsay rule “[a] record or statement of a public office” that “sets out . . . factual findings from a legally authorized investigation,” applied to the FBI’s own conclusion as to consent. (The court noted that Doe offered a “brief[]” and “conclusory” argument that the FBI’s conclusion was not a “factual finding,” but determined that “Doe’s failure to adequately brief this argument . . .means that she has abandoned it.”) Thus, while the portion of the report recounting the crewman’s statements was inadmissible hearsay, and “the fact of the government’s declination of prosecution [was] likely unduly prejudicial,” the Special Agent’s conclusion that the encounter had been consensual was in a public record, not unduly prejudicial, and not shown to be untrustworthy, and accordingly should have been admitted. Admission of that conclusion, in turn, created a material factual dispute precluding summary judgment.
Further, “the erroneous grant of summary judgment on the false imprisonment claim ‘could have affected the outcome of the case’ in three respects.” First, the summary-judgment analysis led the district judge to exclude from trial the Special Agent’s conclusion as to consent. Second, as a result of the same error infecting the summary judgment, Carnival was not allowed to question Doe’s experts about the report. Finally, proof of consent was a defense not only to the false imprisonment claim, but also to the sexual assault claim tried to the jury. The Special Agent’s “conclusion from her investigation could have been the deciding factor for the jury.” Consequently, a new trial on the false imprisonment and sexual assault claims was required.