In a significant decision for foreign companies with U.S. trademarks, the Eleventh Circuit held that a foreign intellectual-property holding company can be subject to personal jurisdiction in U.S. courts based solely on its registration and strategic use of U.S. trademarks. The court’s opinion, Jekyll Island-State Park Authority v. Polygroup Macau Limited, 2025 WL 1637952, No. 23-11415 (11th Cir. June 10, 2025), provides a roadmap for district courts evaluating the existence of specific personal jurisdictional over foreign companies, particularly those that rely on U.S. law to protect their intellectual property.
Background
Jekyll Island-State Park Authority operates the Summer Waves Water Park on Jekyll Island, Georgia, and for decades has had a registered trademark for “SUMMER WAVES.” In 2021, the general counsel of Polygroup Macau—an entity incorporated and registered in the British Virgin Islands—contacted Jekyll Island about purchasing its web domain, summerwaves.com, leading Jekyll to discover that Polygroup Macau had obtained several U.S. trademark registrations for similar marks.
Although Polygroup Macau claimed not to conduct business in the U.S. or collect royalties, it is part of a global group of consumer-goods manufacturers, many of which market and sell goods under Polygroup Macau’s various marks. The SUMMER WAVES marks, specifically, were used in the U.S. on inflatable pools and similar products manufactured and distributed by affiliates of Polygroup Macau and sold through retailers like Walmart, Costco, and Amazon.
Jekyll Island sued Polygroup Macau in the Southern District of Georgia for trademark infringement, unfair competition, and cancellation of the marks. Polygroup Macau moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. After allowing jurisdictional discovery, the district court granted the motion and dismissed the case.
Eleventh Circuit’s Decision
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Polygroup Macau was proper under the “national long-arm statute” set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). This rule permits a federal court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant if three criteria are met: (1) the claim arises under federal law; (2) the defendant is not subject to jurisdiction in any individual state; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction complies with constitutional due process.
Here, the first two prongs were undisputed, so the court’s decision turned on the due-process prong. Although similar to the due-process analysis taught in every 1L civil procedure course, the due-process requirement under Rule 4(k)(2) stems from the Fifth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth. The minimum-contacts analysis therefore is not state-specific. That is, the court first must consider whether the defendant has purposefully availed itself of the protections of the United States as a whole, as opposed to the forum state itself. Further, because Polygroup Macau was not “at home” in the United States such that it would be subject to general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction would be required, meaning the lawsuit must arise out of or relate to the contacts with the forum. Finally, the court must be satisfied that the exercise of jurisdiction would comport with fair play and substantial justice.
1. Purposeful Availment and Minimum Contacts
Although the Eleventh Circuit stopped short of holding that the registration of any U.S. trademark was enough to meet the purposeful-availment test, Polygroup Macau’s pervasive use of U.S. intellectual-property law—which was central to its business purpose—easily met that test. Polygroup Macau had registered more than 60 trademarks with the USPTO and filed at least 30 patent applications. It also used U.S. law firms (including in Georgia) to prosecute these rights and filed lawsuits in U.S. courts to enforce them.
Further, Polygroup Macau registered its SUMMER WAVES marks under § 1(a) of the Lanham Act, which requires actual use in U.S. commerce. So, if Polygroup Macau didn’t use the marks itself, it necessarily relied on use by affiliates, suggesting knowledge and control at a minimum. The court also emphasized that trademark owners must submit periodic declarations of use in commerce to maintain registration, further tying Polygroup Macau to the U.S. marketplace.
Although Polygroup Macau claimed it neither licensed its marks nor earned royalties, it enabled affiliated companies to use the marks without restriction in U.S. commerce. These affiliates sold branded products through major U.S. retailers, operated distribution centers and offices in the United States, and paid Polygroup Macau’s legal and registration costs. Polygroup Macau described itself as providing the “Polygroup family of companies” with access to IP assets. The relationship amounted to either an implied licensing arrangement or an alter-ego relationship, and the court would look past the absence of formal licensing agreements to the functional reality of a coordinated enterprise exploiting U.S. trademark protections.
2. Relationship Between the Purposeful Availment and the Litigation
In concluding that these contacts shared a sufficient nexus with the Jekyll Island litigation, the Eleventh Circuit rejected the narrow “but-for” cause test applied by the district court. Under the Supreme Court’s decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351 (2021), the “arise out of or relate to” standard does not require that the defendant’s contacts be the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s claims. It is enough that the litigation be “connected” to the defendant’s forum conduct.
Here, Polygroup Macau’s act of registering the very marks that allegedly infringed Jekyll Island’s rights—and relying on U.S. commerce to maintain those marks—was more than sufficient. Looking at the overall relationship, Polygroup Macau’s “own choices” to use U.S. law and the U.S. market to protect its marks share a common link with the Jekyll Island litigation.
3. Fair Play and Substantial Justice
Finally, the court found no unfairness in subjecting Polygroup Macau to suit in Georgia federal court. Polygroup Macau had regularly hired U.S. law firms (including in Georgia), litigated IP rights in U.S. courts on multiple occasions, and established extensive market ties through its affiliates. This was not a case of an offshore shell company caught unaware; it was an intentional, sustained effort to secure and exploit U.S. legal rights, and the company should have anticipated the possibility of litigation here.