The Eleventh Circuit this month weighed in on the appealability and scope of Florida’s litigation privileges in the context of a defamation lawsuit. In Grippa v. Rubin, No. 23-11717, 2025 WL 997347 (11th Cir. Apr. 3, 2025), the court allowed—under the collateral-order doctrine—immediate appeal of an interlocutory order denying application of the absolute litigation privilege but held that denial of the qualified litigation privilege was not immediately appealable. The court further concluded that an attorney’s sending of letters during ongoing litigation was not protected by the absolute litigation privilege, because the communications were not made within the boundaries of the judicial process.
Background
Back in 2019, Kimberly Grippa interviewed for a job with the then-commissioner of Florida’s Office of Financial Regulation, Ronald Rubin. Grippa did not get the job, and she later reported Rubin for allegedly making discriminatory and inappropriate remarks during the interview.
After Grippa’s complaint led to an internal investigation into Rubin’s conduct, Rubin sued various state officials claiming a political conspiracy aimed at ousting him. Although Grippa was not a party to that lawsuit, Rubin did name her in the suit as a participant in the alleged criminal enterprise. While the suit was pending, Rubin’s attorney later sent letters—attaching a copy of the complaint—to Florida officials requesting a broader inquiry into the purported enterprise and Grippa’s role in it.
Based on these letters, Grippa filed a defamation suit against Rubin in Florida state court, later removed to federal court. Rubin moved for summary judgment, arguing that the letters were protected by Florida’s absolute or, in the alternative, qualified litigation privilege. He also argued that he could not be held vicariously liable for statements made by his attorney.
The district court denied Rubin’s motion for summary judgment on all three grounds. Rubin appealed the order, invoking the collateral order doctrine to seek immediate review.
Court’s Decision
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed whether it had jurisdiction to review the denial of each asserted defense and, if yes, addressed the merits of that defense:
Absolute Litigation Privilege
The court held that an interlocutory order denying the absolute litigation privilege can be immediately appealed under the collateral order doctrine. This privilege is an immunity from suit, not just from liability, because parties must be free to litigate “without fear of having to defend their actions in a subsequent civil action.”
This conclusion, however, was of no help to Rubin, because the court affirmed the denial of that immunity. The absolute litigation privilege covers statements made only during judicial proceedings or in court filings. Here, the letters were sent outside the judicial process, to uninvolved government officials, and included commentary beyond the filed complaint. The fact that a communication relates to pending litigation does not alone shield it from a defamation suit.
Qualified Litigation Privilege
The court did not reach the merits of Rubin’s qualified litigation privilege argument, because appeal of that issue was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Unlike the absolute privilege, the qualified litigation privilege is not an immunity from suit but rather a defense to liability. Specifically, it is a fact-based defense that turns on whether Rubin acted with express malice. Further, the question of malice is for the jury and not appropriate for immediate appeal.
Vicarious Liability
For similar reasons, the court also dismissed Rubin’s appeal regarding whether he could be vicariously liable for his attorney’s actions. Rubin’s argument concerned factual determinations about whether he directed or authorized the letters, which must also be addressed at trial.
Conclusion
Grippa is a reminder to be careful what you say about other parties (and nonparties) even when you have litigation pending. More broadly, the court’s discussion of the collateral-order doctrine will be useful in analyzing the appealability of interlocutory orders denying other species of immunity.